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TAKING THE FEAR OUT OF BEING A TATTLETALE:
WHISTLE BLOWER PROTECTION UNDER THE FALSE
CLAIMS ACT AND NEAL V. HONEYWELL, INC.*
INTRODUCTION
When young children misbehave, they never think they will be
caught and are often amazed when a parent confronts them with
their bad act. Children ask, "How did you know I did it?" To which
the parent might reply, "I see everything because I have eyes in the
back of my head." However, no one can see everything, and cer-
tainly no one has eyes in the back of their head. What many chil-
dren do not understand is that authorities often need and receive
help in catching cunning culprits. Without the watchful eyes of
others, many culprits would never be caught.
This truth is clearly evident in government defense contracts
where fraud is rampant and widespread. For instance, in 1985,
forty-five of the one hundred largest defense contractors, and nine of
the top ten, were under investigation for multiple fraud offenses
against the United States government.1 In terms of dollars lost to
fraud, the result is even more staggering. Fraud has been estimated
as draining between one to ten percent of the federal budget.2 This
means that using the government's 1985 spending level of one tril-
lion dollars, fraud costs the government and, in turn, the taxpayers,
* The author of this Note gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Joshua G. Vincent,
Hinshaw and Culbertson, Chicago, Illinois, and DePaul University College of Law Adjunct
Faculty member, for providing the idea for this Note, as well as valuable insight and information
necessary for its completion.
1. S. REP. No. 345, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5267
(citing Hearings on Fed. Sec. L. and Def. Conf. before the subcomm. on oversight and investiga-
tions of the House Comm. on Energy and Com., 99th Cong. 1st Sess.)
2. Id., reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5268.
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an estimated ten to one hundred billion dollars per year.8
For over a century, the United States Government has realized
that it, like other authority figures, cannot keep tabs on all of its
contractors. Therefore, it created the False Claims Act" to provide
private citizens with the authority to help curb fraudulent practices
committed by government contractors. However, even school chil-
dren know that blowing the whistle on someone can lead to negative
repercussions, and employees are aware of the possibility of losing
their job if they blow the whistle on their employer." Therefore, as
part of the False Claims Act, Congress enacted provisions which
reward private citizens who assist the government in ferreting out
fraud and protect any employee assisting the government from em-
ployer retaliation.6
This Note discusses the protection section 3730(h) of the False
Claims Act gives to employees who assist the government in identi-
fying fraudulent defense contractors. Section I of this Note will ex-
amine the history of the False Claims Act and the recent district
court decisions relating specifically to section 3730(h). Section II
will analyze the recent decision of the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit in Neal v. Honeywell, Inc. and section
III will examine this decision in light of section II's discussion of the
False Claims Act and section 3730(h). Finally, in section IV this
author will argue that Neal v. Honeywell, Inc. is a step in the right
direction to protecting employees from employer retaliation, but
that more is necessary to make the employees "whole" under section
3730(h).
3. Id.
4. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-31 (1988).
5. Prior to the enactment of the whistleblower protections in the False Claims Act, private
citizens instituted very few actions under the False Claims Act because they feared being left
unemployed and penniless. Mark A. Thompson, Cashing in on Military Fraud, CAL. LAW., Oct.
1988, at 33; see infra notes 52-55 and accompanying text (comparing the number of actions pri-
vate citizens filed before Congress enacted the whistle blower protection provisions of the False
Claims Act with the number of actions private citizens filed after the enactment of the whistle
blower protection provisions).
6. Throughout the history of the False Claims Act, the government has rewarded private citi-
zens for their assistance in ferreting out contractor fraud. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(l)-(2) (1988). The
government has only recently provided protection to employees from employer retaliation. Id. §
3730(h) (1988). For a discussion of the history of the False Claims Act, see infra notes 8-84 and
accompanying text.




To fully comprehend the Seventh Circuit's holding in Neal v.
Honeywell, Inc., one must understand the history of the False
Claims Act, and more specifically section 3730(h), as well as how
section 3730(h) has been interpreted by the courts.
A. History of the False Claims Act
In 1863, the United States of America was in the midst of the
Civil War. The Union Army was struggling to contain a rebel army
which it vastly outnumbered in terms of both men and materials.8
One reason for the Union Army's struggle was that it was also wag-
ing a war against a different, less well-known adversary - its sup-
pliers.9 While trying to defeat the rebel army, the Union military
leaders had to contend with widespread corruption and fraud prac-
ticed by defense contractors which supplied the Union Army. 10
Some companies sold the United States Cavalry the same horses
and mules multiple times." Others delivered defective supplies or no
supplies at all. For instance, some unscrupulous contractors deliv-
ered bullets loaded with sawdust instead of gun powder.12 Union
soldiers opened crates expecting to find muskets, but found sawdust
instead."3 Others wore boots that came apart at the seams in less
than a week.' 4 And some slept in tents not waterproofed to Army
specifications.' 5
To curb the widespread fraud and corruption, Congress enacted
the False Claims Act (FCA) in 1863.1 The FCA is sometimes re-
8. James B. Helmer, Jr. & Robert C. Neff, Jr., War Stories: A History of the Qui Tam
Provisions of the False Claims Act, The 1986 Amendments to the False Claims Act, and Their
Application in the United States ex rel. Gravitt v. General Electric Co. Litigation, 18 OHIO N.U.
L. REV. 35, 35 (1991).
9. S. REP. No. 345, supra note 1, at 8, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5273.
10. Id.; see also Kent D. Strader, Counterclaims Against Whistleblowers: Should Counter-
claims Against Qui Tam Plaintiffs Be Allowed in False Claims Act Cases, 62 U. CIN. L. REV.
713, 728-29 (1993) (discussing difficulties the Union army encountered as a result of defense
contractor fraud).
11. Id. at 728 n.90 (citing 132 CONG. REC. H6482 (statement of Rep. Berman)).
12. Thompson, supra note 5, at 33.
13. Id.
14. BILL GILBERT, GOD GAVE Us THIS COUNTRY 145-52 (1989).
15. Id.
16. United States v. Bornstein, 423 U.S. 303, 309 (1976). In a footnote, the court noted that
the FCA was adopted to punish and prevent fraud by government contractors. Id. at 309-10 n.5
(quoting CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 952 (statements of Sen. Howard)). For the text of
the original FCA, see Act of Mar. 2, 1863, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696. In 1875, the FCA was re-enacted
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ferred to as the "Abraham Lincoln Law"' 7 because President Lin-
coln urged its enactment in the face of such widespread corrup-
tion. 8 At President Lincoln's insistence,'" the FCA included qui
tam2 ° provisions which encouraged private citizens to help prevent
fraud by allowing them to file an action on behalf of themselves and
the government.21 President Lincoln insisted on including the qui
tam provisions because, as a small town lawyer, he knew the private
bar could be a tremendous ally in the government's fight against
defense contractor fraud.2
Under the FCA as originally enacted, private citizens could file
qui tam claims in which the government could recover damages, but
could not intervene.23 A qui tam plaintiff was entitled to half of the
government's recovery, which included $2,000 for each false claim
and twice the resulting damages.2 4 As stated by one court, the FCA
was passed upon a theory as old as modern civilization - "one of
the least expensive and most effective means of preventing frauds on
the treasury is to make the perpetrators of them liable to actions by
private persons acting . . . under the strong stimulus of personal ill
will or the hope of gain."28 However, as originally enacted, the FCA
did not protect an employee filing a qui tam action from employer
retaliation.26
as sections 3490-94 of the Revised Statute. See U.S. REv. STAT. tit. 36, §§ 3490-94 (1875). In
1976, section 5438 was codified under sections 231 to 235 of title 31 to United States Code. See
31 U.S.C. §§ 231-35 (1976). The FCA is now codified under sections 3729 to 3731 of title 31 of
the United States Code. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-31 (1982); see also Helmer & Neff, supra note 8,
at 36 (stating that the FCA was enacted in response to deprivations suffered by the Union army).
17. 132 CONG. REc. H6479 (statement of Rep. Glickman); see also Strader, supra note 10, at
729 N.92 (describing why the FCA is sometimes termed the "Abraham Lincoln Law").
18. Eletta S. Callahan & Terry M. Dworkin, Do Good and Get Rich: Financial Incentives for
Whistleblowing and the False Claims Act, 37 VILL. L. REv. 273, 302 (1992).
19. Helmer & Neff, supra note 8, at 36.
20. "Qui tam" derives from the Latin phrase, "qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in
hac parte sequitur," meaning, "he who brings the action for the king as well as for himself." Neal
v. Honeywell, Inc., 826 F. Supp. 266, 268 (N.D. Il1. 1993) (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COM-
MENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 160 (1768)), affd, 33 F.3d 860 (7th Cir. 1994); see also
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1251 (6th ed. 1990).
21. A private citizen who files an action under the FCA is generally referred to as a qui tam
plaintiff. Neal, 826 F. Supp. at 268. Qui tam plaintiffs are also referred to as relators. See United
States v. Griswold, 30 F.762, 763 (C.C.D. Or. 1887).
22. Helmer & Neff, supra note 8, at 35 (citing 132 CONG. REC. H6482 (statement of Rep.
Berman)).
23. Strader, supra note 10, at 729-30.
24. Act of Mar. 2, 1863, ch. 67, § 6, 12 Stat. at 698; see also Strader, supra note 10, at 730
(describing a qui tam plaintiff's incentive for bringing a qui tam suit under the FCA).
25. Griswold, 30 F. at 766.
26. Strader, supra note 10, at 730.
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Congress made the first changes to the FCA in 1943.27 At this
time, the United States government encountered another onslaught
of defense contractor fraud while preparing for World War 11.28
During the 1940's, unlike the Civil War, the United States Govern-
ment vigorously pursued violators of the FCA.2 9 However, several
plaintiffs filed qui tam actions which appeared to be based on crimi-
nal indictments which the government had instituted.30 In fact,
many resourceful individuals waited in federal courthouses and filed
civil actions pursuant to the FCA immediately after the government
brought criminal indictments against defense contractors.3 1 One
such action, United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 2 opened the
floodgates for qui tam litigation by holding that qui tam plaintiffs
could base their claims on information already possessed by the gov-
ernment.83 Accordingly, qui tam plaintiffs could bring suits based
on the public information of criminal fraud indictments.3 4
At the behest of then Attorney General Francis Biddle and in
response to the Supreme Court's decision in Marcus, Congress
amended the FCA in 1943." Under the 1943 amendments, qui tam
plaintiffs could no longer bring suits under the FCA if the suits were
based upon information which the government already possessed. 6
The amendments also gave the government the power to intervene
in qui tam actions. 7 Finally, the amendments reduced a qui tam
plaintiff's recovery to twenty-five percent if acting without the gov-
27. For a discussion of the changes made to the FCA in 1943, see infra notes 35-41 and accom-
panying text.
28. Helmer & Neff, supra note 8, at 38.
29. Id.
30. S. REP. No. 345, supra note 1, at 10, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5275.
31. Helmer & Neff, supra note 8, at 38.
32. 317 U.S. 537 (1943). In Marcus, defendants were electrical contractors who had engaged
in collusive bidding in contracts with "local governmental units" but were paid in part by the
United States government. Id. at 539. Marcus brought civil suit under the FCA on his own behalf
and in the name of the United States. Id. The government, who received $54,000 from defendants
in prior criminal proceedings, argued that Marcus should not be entitled to half of the $315,000
recovered in the qui tam suit because he received his information from the criminal indictment,
not from his own investigation. Id. at 545. The Court, however, ruled that the statute as written,
did not require a plaintiff to bring a qui tam suit based on original information. Id. at 546-48.
33. Strader, supra note 10, at 730.
34. James T. Blanch, Note, The Constitutionality of the False Claims Act's Qui Tam Provi-
sion, 16 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 701, 704 (1993).
35. S. REP. No. 345, supra note 1, at 10-12, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5275-77. For
text of the amendments, see Act of Dec. 23, 1943, ch. 377, 57 Stat. 608.
36. Strader, supra note 10, at 730.
37. Id.
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ernment's help and ten percent if the government intervened. 8 The
dual purposes of the 1943 amendments were to discourage private
litigants from instituting qui tam actions based on information al-
ready known to the government 9 and to end races to the courthouse
between potential qui tam plaintiffs and the government.4 The
1943 amendments to the FCA successfully furthered their purposes
because they greatly reduced the number of qui tam claims filed by
qui tam plaintiffs. 1
In the 1980s, the United States was involved in an immense mili-
tary peacetime buildup and was spending large sums of money on
military hardware. 2 Accordingly, the government once again faced
widespread corruption and fraud on behalf of defense contractors4 3
During this period, instead of crates of sawdust and defective boots
and tents,4 the government was facing alarming reports of $400
hammers and $7,000 coffee pots. 5 In response to the highly preva-
lent fraud and corruption and due to inadequate enforcement proce-
dures, Congress sought to revive the qui tam provisions by amend-
ing the FCA in 1986.46 Under the 1986 amendments, qui tam
plaintiffs could bring suits based on information already known to
the government, but could not bring suits based on ongoing proceed-
ings.47 Congress also increased the liability for violations of the
38. Id.
39. United States ex rel. Bayarsky v. Brooks, 210 F.2d 257, 259 (3d Cir. 1954); United States
ex rel. Sherr v. Anaconda Wire & Cable Co., 57 F. Supp. 106, 107-08 (S.D.N.Y. 1944), aff'd,
149 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 762 (1945).
40. United States v. Baker-Lockwood Mfg. Co., 138 F.2d 48, 53 (8th Cir. 1943), vacated, 321
U.S. 744 (1944). See generally, Helmer & Neff, supra note 8, at 38-39 (stating that one reason
the FCA was amended in 1943 was to eliminate the races to the courthouse between the govern-
ment and private litigators).
41. Valerie R. Park, Note, The False Claims Act, Qui Tam Relators, and the Government:
Which is the Real Party to the Action?, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1061, 1066 (1991); see also, Evan
Caminker, Note, The Constitutionality of Qui Tam Actions, 99 YALE L.J. 341, 343-44 n.12
(1989) (attributing the "virtual dormancy throughout the past half-century" of qui tam actions to
the severe jurisdictional restrictions Congress imposed on qui tam actions through the 1943
amendments).
42. Helmer & Neff, supra note 8, at 40-41 (citing 136 CONG. REC. S15,459 (daily ed. Oct. 17,
1990) (statement of Sen. Sasser)).
43. Id.
44. See supra notes 8-15 and accompanying text (discussing fraudulent practices by Civil War
defense contractors).
45. 131 CONG. REc. H5135 (statement of Rep. Weiss).
46. False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562, 100 Stat. 3153-69 (codified as
amended at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-33 (1988)); see also Tedd J. Kochman & Garen Meguerian, False
Claims, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 525, 534 (1994) (discussing the motivation behind 1986 amend-
ments to the FCA).
47. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(3) (1988). Thus, the 1986 amendments "remain faithful to the spirit
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FCA to include treble damages and a civil penalty between $5,000
and $10,000 for each instance of violation." The 1986 amendments
increased the percentage of a qui tam plaintiff's guaranteed recov-
ery to between fifteen and twenty-five percent if the government in-
tervened4 9 and between twenty-five and thirty percent if the qui tam
plaintiff pursued the claim without the help of government interven-
tion.50 Finally, through the 1986 amendments, Congress prohibited
employers from retaliating against employees who brought suit
under the FCA.51
Prior to the 1986 amendments, private citizens did not institute
many actions under the FCA because they feared being left unem-
ployed and penniless." In fact, immediately prior to the 1986
amendments, six or fewer qui tam claims were being brought under
the FCA each year.5 3 However, in the seven years subsequent to the
1986 amendments, qui tam plaintiffs filed approximately 600
claims, compared with only twenty qui tam claims filed in the ten
years prior to the 1986 amendments.55
In 1988, Congress again amended the FCA.56 The 1988 amend-
ments were intended to eliminate recovery for a qui tam plaintiff
of. . .preventing parasitic lawsuits . . . without frustrating the goals of the qui tam provisions."
Helmer & Neff, supra note 8, at 50.
48. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (1988).
49. Id. § 3730(d)(1). The size of a qui tam plaintiff's recovery under this subsection is deter-
mined by "the extent to which the person substantially contributed to the prosecution of the ac-
tion." Id.; see also Kochman & Meguerian, supra note 46, at 537 (discussing the amount qui tam
plaintiffs may recover under § 3730(d)(1)); see supra notes 8-41 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing damages and penalties before the 1986 amendments to the FCA).
50. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(2) (1988). The size of a qui tam plaintiff's recovery under this subsec-
tion is determined by what the judge deems reasonable within the twenty-five to thirty percent
parameters. Id.; see also Kochman & Meguerian, supra note 46, at 537 (discussing the amount
qui tam plaintiffs may recover under § 3730(d)(2)); see supra notes 23-41 and accompanying text
(discussing a qui tam plaintiff's share in recovery under the FCA prior to the 1986 amendments).
51. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) (1988); see also John T. Boese, Qui Tam: Beyond Government Con-
tracts, in LITIGATION 1993, at 551 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No.
456, 1993) (stating that the FCA "prevents the harassment, retaliation, or threatening of employ-
ees who assist in or bring qui tam cases"); see infra notes 59-84 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the protections the 1986 amendments to the FCA grant employees).
52. Thompson, supra note 5, at 33.
53. Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 18, at 303.
54. In these cases, the government has recovered approximately five-hundred million dollars.
Kochman & Meguerian, supra note 46, at 537.
55. Id. (citing Letter from Frank W. Hunger, Assistant Attorney General, United States Dept.
of Justice to Sen. Howell Heflin, Chairman, Subcommitttee on Courts and Administrative Prac-
tice, United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary (Sept. 2, 1993) (on file in the United
States Senate)).
56. Pub. L. No. 100-700, § 9, 102 Stat. 4638 (1988) (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(3)).
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who was the "principal architect" of the fraud,57 but did not intend
to eliminate recovery for a qui tam plaintiff who was convicted of
participating in the fraud, but played only a minor role in the
fraud .
B. Section 3730(h) of the False Claims Act
Section 3730(h) of the FCA discourages employers from harass-
ing, retaliating against, threatening or in any other manner discrim-
inating against any employee who assists in or brings suit under the
FCA.5 9 Any employee who has experienced such discrimination by
his or her employer is entitled to be made whole.60 This includes:
reinstatement at the same seniority position the employee would
have obtained but for the discrimination, double back pay with in-
terest61 and "compensation for any special damages sustained as a
result of the discrimination. 62 The scope of the term, "special dam-
ages," is not defined by the FCA,63 although it clearly includes liti-
gation costs and reasonable attorneys' fees."
The legislative history behind section 3730(h) indicates that it
had a twofold purpose. First, the section was intended to encourage
57. Helmer & Neff, supra note 8, at 50-51.
58. Id.
59. Section 3730(h) provides, in its entirety:
Any employee who is discharged, demoted, suspended, threatened, harassed, or in any
other manner discriminated against in the terms and conditions of employment by his
or her employer because of lawful acts done by the employee on behalf of the em-
ployee or others in furtherance of an action under this section, including investigation
for, initiation of, testimony for, or assistance in an action filed or to be filed under this
section, shall be entitled to all relief necessary to make the employee whole. Such
relief shall include reinstatement with the same seniority status such employee would
have had but for the discrimination, 2 times the amount of back pay, interest on the
back pay, and compensation for any special damages sustained as a result of the
discrimination, including litigation costs and reasonable attorneys' fees. An employee
may bring an action in the appropriate district court of the United States for the
relief provided in this subsection.
31 U.S.C. § 3730 (h) (1988).
60. Id. For the text of Section 3730(h), see supra note 59.
61. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) (1988). To avoid unjust compensation to an employee who recovers
under this section, the interest payment should be calculated before the back pay is doubled. H.R.
REP. No. 660, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1986).
62. Id. Section 3730(h) also specifically provides for litigation costs and reasonable attorneys'
fees. 31 U.S.C. 3730(h) (1988). For the text of Section 3730(h), see supra note 59.
63. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-31 (1988).
64. The legislative history of Section 3730(h) indicates that the scope of the term, "special
damages," is to extend beyond litigation costs and reasonable attorney's fees. See infra notes 65-
72. However, the term "special damages," clearly includes litigation costs and reasonable attor-
neys' fees. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) (1988). For the full text of Section 3730(h), see supra note 59.
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private citizens to assist in the government's fraud enforcement ef-
fort65 without the fear of losing their job or personal security.6  The
necessity of encouraging private citizens to assist in exposing Gov-
ernment contractor fraud became clear after several individuals tes-
tified about the difficult decisions they faced before "blowing the
whistle" on their employers.6" Therefore, to encourage the assistance
of employees, the relief portion of section 3730(h) was designed, in
part, to make the employee whole again if the employer retaliated
and to resolve the problem of a potential plaintiff being unable to
afford to institute an action. 8
The second purpose of section 3730(h) was to provide punishment
and deterrence for any employer who engaged in retaliatory action
against an employee.69 A lack of effective deterrence was thought to
be one of the reasons fraud was so pervasive and costly to the gov-
ernment.7 0 Congress felt that an effective vehicle for private individ-
uals to expose fraud was necessary for meaningful fraud deter-
rence.7 1 Accordingly, the relief portion of section 3730(h) was also
designed to provide stiff penalties for employers who retaliated
65. S. REP. No. 345, supra note 1, at 8, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5273. To help
encourage assistance, "incentives for exposing fraud should be available in as many forms as pos-
sible." Id. at 29, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5295. The Major Fraud Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1031 (Supp. V 1993) (MFA), contains a nearly identical whistle blower protection provision. 18
U.S.C. § 1031(h) (Supp. V 1993). The MFA's whistle blower protection provision was patterned
after the FCA's and was intended to provide for the "granting of broad relief." S. REP. No. 503,
100th Cong. 2d Sess. 4 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5969, 5971; see also id. at 15,
reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5979 (stating that the MFA's whistle blower protection provi-
sion "is similar to the one included in the False Claims Act").
66. False Claims Act Amendments: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Law
and Governmental Relations, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 405 (1986) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement
of John R. Phillips).
67. One such individual, Robert Wityczak, testified about exposing the mischarging practices of
his employer, Rockwell International. S. REP. No. 345, supra note 1, at 5, reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5270. Wityczak testified that he agonized over his decision to step forward be-
cause he had to consider supporting his wife and five children and paying his house mortgage. Id.
After deciding to report the mischarging and before his ultimate discharge, Wityczak testified he
"was squeezed out of the work [he] was doing . . . and put to work doing menial tasks outside
[his] job description." Id. Wityczak concluded that, from his own experience and talking with his
co-workers, there is "absolutely no encouragement or incentive" for employees in the defense in-
dustry to report fraud. Id.
68. Hearings, supra note 66, at 406 (testimony of John R. Phillips); see supra, notes 60-64 and
accompanying text (discussing the relief provided by Section 3730(h)).
69. Hearings, supra note 66, at 405 (testimony of John R. Phillips).
70. S. RaP. No. 345, supra note 1, at 3, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5269. In 1984, the
Economic Crime Council of the Department of Justice concluded that defense procurement pro-
grams was an economic crime area where stronger deterrence was needed. Id. at 4, reprinted in
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5269.
71. Id. at 15, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5279.
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against an employee who provided assistance to the government.72
Despite its broad use in virtually every qui tam case, case law
interpreting section 3730(h) is very sparse. s One issue relating to
section 3730(h) which has been the subject of written opinions is
whether recovery under the section requires a qui tam action to be
filed. Decisions on this issue have been split. In Rehrnan v. ECC
International Corporation,7 4 the United States district court in Flor-
ida stated that the section should be broadly construed because its
intent is to assure employees that their jobs would not be endan-
gered if they investigate and report possible misconduct of govern-
ment contractors, "regardless of the informality or nascent status of
the proceeding.""" Thus, according to the Rehman court, a qui tam
action is not required for a plaintiff to gain recovery under section
3730(h). The United States district court in California in United
States ex rel. Kent v. Aiello1 7  reached the same conclusion.77 In
Kent, the court stated that section 3730(h) extends coverage beyond
qui tam plaintiffs to those who suffer harm after making an internal
corporate complaint relative to fraud against the government, even
when no qui tam lawsuit is ever filed. 8
Other courts have concluded that a qui tam action is necessary
for a plaintiff to recover pursuant to section 3730(h). In Casarez v.
Delco Sys. Operations,9 another United States district court in Cal-
72. Hearings. supra note 66, at 405 (testimony of John R. Phillips) (stating that, as part of the
stiff penalties, an employer could be liable to the employee for double back pay, special damages
and, if warranted, punitive damages); see supra, notes 60-64 and accompanying text (discussing
the relief provided by Section 3730(h)).
73. Boese, supra note 51, at 551. According to Boese, section 3730(h) has been the subject of
few written opinions because it "is poorly drafted." Id.
74. Rehman v. ECC Int'l Corp., No. 90-425-Civ-Orl-22, 1993 WL 85758 (M.D. Fla. 1993). In
Rehman, the employer argued that, because the employee never notified them that he was acting
under the FCA, they could not have retaliated against the employee on that basis. Id. at *2. The
court, however, rejected the employer's narrow interpretation of the section and denied the em-
ployer's motion for summary judgment. Id.
75. Id.
76. United States ex rel. Kent v. Aiello, 836 F. Supp. 720 (E.D. Cal. 1993). In Kent, plaintiff
informed the government of allegedly false claims defendants were making to the Farmers Home
Administration (FmHA). Id. at 722. Plaintiff alleged that she uncovered the information during
the course of her employment and that she was terminated "in retaliation for lawful acts done in
furtherance of the qui tam action." Id. After noting that Section 3730(h) extends protection be-
yond a qui tam plaintiff, the court held that Section 3730(h) clearly provided protection to plain-
tiff, a qui tam plaintiff. Id. at 724.
77. Id. at 723-24.
78. Id.
79. Casarez v. Delco Sys. Operations, No. CV 92-6844 AWT, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4387
(C.D. Cal. 1993). In Casarez, plaintiff did not respond to defendant's motion to dismiss and the
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ifornia interpreted the language of section 3730(h) to mean that the
actual filing of a qui tam lawsuit is an absolute prerequisite to a
retaliation suit under section 3730(h).80 In X Corp. v. Doe,81 a
United States district court in Virginia stated that a plaintiff must
be able to prove acts in furtherance of a qui tam action in order to
obtain recovery under section 3730(h).8 1 In Hardin v. DuPont Scan-
dinavia," a United States district court in New York held that re-
lief under section 3730(h) is limited to "employees" and suggested
that, to obtain recovery, steps must be taken in furtherance of a qui
tam action. 4
II. SUBJECT OPINION - NEAL v. HONEYWELL, INC.
A. Factual Background and Procedural History
In 1987, Judith Neal (Neal) was an employee at the Joliet Army
Arsenal Plant which Honeywell, Inc. (Honeywell) administered.8 5
During the course of her employment, Neal discovered that several
of her co-workers were falsifying ballistics tests reports on ammuni-
tion the plant manufactured and that the plant was selling the de-
fective ammunition to the United States Army.8 6 Through her own
investigation, Neal also discovered that Honeywell's conspiracy to
falsify test data had been occurring since at least 1983 and that
court made its decision without the benefit of an argument in opposition to defendant's argument.
Id. at *1.
80. Id. at *2.
81. X Corp. v. Doe, 816 F. Supp. 1086 (E.D. Va. 1993). In X Corp., an in-house attorney of a
computer manufacturer/supplier was allegedly fired after he investigated possible fraudulent
claims by his employer against the federal government and urged the employer to comply with
federal regulations. Id. at 1089-90. In the course of his investigation, the attorney distributed
articles relating to qui tam actions to other in-house attorneys and secretly copied several files
which he believed to show that his employer defrauded the federal government. Id. at 1090-91.
The court held that the attorney had not stated a cause of action under section 3730(h) because
he could not prove "(i) he took acts in furtherance of a qui tam suit; (ii) [his employer] knew of
these acts; and (iii) [his employer] discharged him because of these acts." Id. at 1095.
82. Id. at 1095-97.
83. Hardin v. DuPont Scandinavia, 731 F. Supp. 1202 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). In Hardin, plaintiff
sought recovery under section 3730(h) after she lost commissions because she refused to partici-
pate in her employer's allegedly unlawful scheme to avoid income taxes. Id. The court stated that
plaintiff, either an independent contractor or partner with defendants, did not fall under the pro-
tection section 3730(h) provides for employees. Id. at 1205. The court also stated that plaintiff
had failed to state a 3730(h) claim because her "alleged loss was the result of her refusal to
participate in the alleged scheme, not the result of steps taken in furtherance of the action." Id.
84. Id.
85. Neal v. Honeywell, Inc., 33 F.3d 860, 860 (7th Cir. 1994).
86. Neal v. Honeywell, Inc., 826 F. Supp. 266, 267 (N.D. Ill. 1993), affid, 33 F.3d 860 (7th
Cir. 1994).
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company executives were probably aware of the fraud.8 7 During the
conspiracy, Honeywell's fraudulent conduct cost the government
over fifteen million dollars.88
Neal called an internal company "hotline" to report the com-
pany's fraudulent conduct and inquire about her options.89 A Hon-
eywell attorney answered the call and informed Neal that she could
report the conduct to him and retain her anonymity, but did not
inform Neal that she could proceed under the FCA90 and file a qui
tam suit.9 1 After Neal's disclosure, Honeywell began an internal in-
vestigation and notified the United States Army.'2 Honeywell's in-
vestigation led senior managers of Honeywell and public prosecutors
to conclude that Neal did in fact discover fraudulent conduct on
behalf of Honeywell and several of its employees."3 As a result of
the investigation, Honeywell and the government agreed to a settle-
ment without requiring the United States to bring a civil suit under
the FCA.94 Under the terms of the settlement, Honeywell gave the
government approximately $2.5 million worth of cash and ammuni-
tion."5 Honeywell's investigation also resulted in the United States
Attorney filing two criminal informations against two Honeywell
employees who plead guilty to the charges.' 6
During Honeywell's three-month investigation and after the
United States and Honeywell resolved the matter, Honeywell dis-
criminated against and harassed Neal.'7 Honeywell supervisors took
umbrage against Neal's disclosure because they believed she
threatened Honeywell's defense contract with the government and
thus their jobs. 98 No one at Honeywell ever questioned Neal about
her discoveries and Honeywell isolated Neal from the investiga-
87. Appellee's Brief at 2, Neal (No. 93-3013).
88. Id.
89. 826 F. Supp. at 267; see also Appellee's Brief at 2, Neal (No. 93-3013).
90. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-31 (1988) (stating that, because Neal did not trust Honeywell execu-
tives and was concerned for her personal safety, she called Honeywell's "hotline" for advice on
exposing the fraud while maintaining her anonymity).
91. Appellee's Brief at 2-3, Neal (No. 93-3013).
92. Neal v. Honeywell, Inc., 33 F.3d 860, 861 (7th Cir. 1994).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. The exact terms of the settlement were $2,013,813 in cash and ammunition worth
$408,872 delivered free of charge. Appellee's Brief at 3, Neal (93-3013).
96. Id.; see also Appellee's Brief at 3, Neal (93-3013).
97. 33 F.3d at 860; see also, Appellee's Brief at 3, Neal (93-3013).
98. 33 F.3d at 860.
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tion. 99 Members of the plant's management physically threatened
Neal and told her that her fellow employees hated her. 100 In addi-
tion, Honeywell did not allow Neal to have contact with other em-
ployees unless her supervisor otherwise directed. 101 Neal interpreted
the discrimination and harassment as an instruction to vamoose' 012
and so feared for her physical safety and professional future that
she quit her position with Honeywell in August of 1987.108
In 1993, Neal instituted an action against Honeywell under sec-
tion 3730(h) of the FCA contending that she had been threatened,
harassed and constructively discharged as a result of "lawful acts
.. . in furtherance of an action under [section 3730(h) of the
FCA] ."104 Neal sought the income she lost when she quit and the
recovery she could have had under the FCA's qui tam provision
10 if
Honeywell's in-house counsel had informed her of her right to bring
a qui tam suit. 10 6 Honeywell moved to dismiss Neal's claim pursu-
ant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) 07 arguing that
Neal was not protected from retaliation by the FCA because no suit
was filed under the FCA. 0 8 Honeywell also moved to strike the por-
tion of Neal's prayer for relief seeking the damages she would have
been entitled to under a qui tam suit.' 0 9 The district court denied
Honeywell's motion to dismiss and found that Neal was protected
by section 3730(h)." 0 The district court also declined to strike the
request for qui tam damages. Honeywell appealed the denial of
their motions to dismiss and strike,"' but the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's find-
99. Neal v. Honeywell, Inc., 826 F. Supp. 266, 267 (N.D. Ill. 1993), affd, 33 F.3d 860 (7th
Cir. 1994).
100. Id.
101. Appellee's Brief at 3, Neal (93-3013).
102. 33 F.3d at 860.
103. Appellee's Brief at 3, Neal (93-3013).
104. 33 F.3d at 860 (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) (1988)).
105. The FCA gives private persons the right to bring a civil action for violations of the FCA
on behalf of themselves and the United States Government. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (1988); see
supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text (discussing a private person's share in the government's
recovery in such an action).
106. 33 F.3d at 864.
107. Rule 12(b)(6) allows a party to move for a dismissal based on a "failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted." See FED. R. Civ. P. 12.
108. 33 F.3d at 861.
109. Neal v. Honeywell, Inc., 826 F. Supp. 266, 273 (N.D. Ill. 1993), affid, 33 F.3d 860 (7th
Cir. 1994).
110. Id.
111. 33 F.3d at 861-62.
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ing that section 3730(h) afforded protection to Neal. 112 In addition,
the Seventh Circuit concluded that Neal was not entitled to the re-
covery she could have received had she been informed of her right to
proceed under a qui tam suit.113
B. The District Court's Reasoning
In holding that Neal was afforded protection under section
3730(h) of the FCA, the district court looked to the purpose of the
FCA and its qui tam provision. "' The court stated that the purpose
of the FCA is "to discourage fraud against the government[, and]
the purpose of the qui tam provision . . . is to encourage those with
knowledge of the fraud to come forward."' 5 The court also noted
that the FCA, in its present form, has a "whistleblower protection
clause" which clearly protects, from employer retaliation, those who
bring a qui tam action and those who initiate, investigate, testify or
assist in "an action filed or to be filed" under the FCA." 6
But, Neal did not divulge her information to the government. 17
Instead, she told company superiors who in turn reported the wrong-
doing to the government." 8 Therefore, the issue before the court
was "whether an internal whistleblower may state a claim under the
whistleblower protection provisions of the [FCA] when no lawsuit
was ever filed, either by the whistleblower or another informer as a
qui tam relator, or by the government."' "19
In making its determination, the court first noted that
whistleblower protection statutes are remedial in nature and are to
be broadly construed so that internal whistle blowing is to be in-
cluded even if the conduct involved does not come under a literal
reading of the statute.2 0 Accordingly, the court reasoned that, even
112. Id. at 862-64.
113. Id. at 865.





118. Id. at 270. For a discussion of the steps taken by Neal and Honeywell to disclose the
information to the government, see supra notes 85-103.
119. 826 F. Supp. at 270.
120. Id. The court based its reasoning on several decisions of other courts which extended pro-
tection to internal whistle blowers under different, but similarly worded statutes. Id. See generally
NLRB v. Scrivener, 405 U.S. 117 (1972) (National Labor Relations Act); Passaic Valley Sewer-
age Comm'rs v. United States Dep't of Labor, 992 F.2d 474 (3d Cir. 1993) (Clean Water Act, 33
U.S.C. § 1367); Jones v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 948 F.2d 258, 264 (6th Cir. 1991) (Pre-amend-
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though Neal's conduct does not fall literally within the FCA, the
great weight of authority makes it clear that courts should liberally
construe section 3730(h) of the FCA to protect conduct which does
not fall within the literal language of the statute.'21 The court noted
that it would make little sense to ignore someone like Neal, "whose
bold conduct led to a quick, voluntary and efficient disclosure of the
fraud and reparation to the government" while protecting a qui tam
plaintiff who filed an expensive and time consuming lawsuit.'22
Therefore, the court held that section 3730(h) of the FCA "forbids
discrimination against an employee who has made an intracorporate
complaint about fraud against the government."' 23
As to Honeywell's request to strike Neal's request for qui tam
damages, the district court denied Honeywell's request, but also de-
clined to make any determination as to the validity of Neal's theory
for recovery."" The court did state, however, that Neal's theory -
that she was defrauded of a valid qui tam action when the Honey-
well "hotline" attorney did not inform her of its availability - may
be "an effective guide to the jury when awarding damages" because
section 3730(h) grants a whistleblower "all relief necessary to make
the employee whole.' ' 25
Finally, the district court certified the following issue for interloc-
utory appeal: Whether the whistleblower protection provision of the
FCA, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h), applies where an employee presents evi-
dence of fraud to her superiors who then voluntarily investigate the
matter, disclose the results to the government and pay reparation
without a qui tam lawsuit ever being filed.' 26
C. The Seventh Circuit's Reasoning
In affirming the district court's holding, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed that section 3730(h) of
ment Energy Reorganization Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5851(a)); Rayner v. Smirl, 873 F.2d 60, 63-64
(4th Cir. 1989) (Federal Railroad Safety Act, 45 U.S.C. § 441(a)); Baker v. Interior Bd. of Mine
Operations Appeals, 595 F.2d 746 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Mine Safety Act, 30 U.S.C. § 820(b)(1)).
But see Brown & Root, Inc. v. Donovan, 747 F.2d 1029, 1031-32 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that
Pre-amendment Energy Reorganization Act does not protect internal whistleblowing).
121. 826 F. Supp. at 271.
122. Id. at 273.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) (1988)).
126. Id. at 274.
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the FCA protected Neal from Honeywell's retaliation. 117 The court
first examined the scope of the phrase, "action filed or to be filed"
found in section 3730(h). ' 28 Noting that the FCA protects "lawful
acts done by the employee . . . in furtherance of an action under
this section,"'' 29 the court stated that each time the word "action"
appears in section 3730 it suggests legal proceedings and that sec-
tion 3730(h) uses the word "action" in the same sense as other sub-
sections of section 3730.130 Consequently, the court found that liti-
gation is not a condition subsequent to perfect protection for
investigatory activities that were protected at the time of their com-
mission.'' The court held that Neal's actions were protected be-
cause, when Neal informed Honeywell of her discovery, litigation
was a distinct possibility and the phrase "filed or to be filed" in
section 3730(h) links protection to events as they were understood at
the time of the investigation. 32
The court also noted that nothing in the language or background
of section 3730(h) suggested that, by paying the government enough
to settle without a lawsuit, "employers acquire the right to shoot the
bearers of bad tidings."' 33 However, according to the court, the lan-
guage "to be filed" does limit the protection to whistle blowers with
legitimate claims."" Thus, an employer may legitimately retaliate
against an employee who fabricates a tale of fraud in an attempt to
receive concessions from the employer in exchange for the em-
ployee's silence. 35
The Seventh Circuit also concluded that Neal's theory of dam-
127. Neal v. Honeywell, Inc., 33 F.3d 860, 865 (7th Cir. 1994). The court initially noted that
section 3730(h) had never been construed or even cited by a court of appeals and invited the
United States to file a brief as amicus curiae. Id. at 863. The United States determined that the
statute supported Neal "without a thumb on the scales of justice." Id. The court of appeals agreed
with this assessment. Id.
128. Id. at 863-64.
129. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) (1988).
130. 33 F.3d at 863.
131. Id. at 864.
132. Id. In holding that Neal's actions were protected by the FCA, the court refused to follow
the holdings of Casarez v. Delco Sys. Operations, No. CV 92-6844 AWT, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
4387 (C.D. Cal. 1993), X Corp. v. Doe, 816 F. Supp. 1086 (E.D. Va. 1993) and Hardin v. Du-
Pont Scandinavia, 731 F. Supp. 1202 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). For a discussion of the Casarez, X Corp.
and Hardin cases, see supra notes 73-84 and accompanying text.
133. Neal, 33 F.3d at 864.
134. Id.
135. Id. Neal's conduct, however, did not amount to an illegitimate claim against Honeywell.
According to the court, "Neal's report was not a figment of her imagination; two guilty pleas and
a hefty settlement show that civil litigation was a real possibility." Id.
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ages was unfounded because the FCA does not require an employer
to inform its employees of their rights under the FCA. 8I The court
stated that damages under section 3730(h) are not to be a substitute
for the recovery an employee could have had in a qui tam suit." 7
According to the court, section 3730(h) compensates an employee
for harm caused by harassment and discharge and is limited to
those damages expressed in its language.138
According to the Seventh Circuit, allowing such a recovery in
cases where the government did not sue would cause deleterious ef-
fects. First, defendants would be exposed to double recovery, which
would lessen the likelihood of future settlements and reduce the
amount a defendant would be willing to pay the government."3 9 It
would also encourage employees to pursue retaliation claims in
doubtful cases. " °0 On a larger scale, the court felt that American
consumers would ultimately foot the bill if the courts allowed such a
recovery because defense contractors would pass the increased cost
of providing services to their customers-federal taxpayers.'
III. ANALYSIS
When Congress enacts a statute without defining its ambiguous
terms, the courts often face the difficult task of deciding exactly
what Congress meant. In this case of first impression, the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals was forced to determine the meanings of
the ambiguous phrases "action filed or to be filed" and "special
damages" in order to decide whether Neal was entitled to recover
damages from her employer, Honeywell, under section 3730(h) of
the FCA and, if so, the extent of her recovery. The Seventh Circuit
correctly decided that Neal was entitled to recover damages from
Honeywell. However, the court erroneously decided to limit Neal's
136. Id. at 865. But see Phillips v. Interior Bd. of Mine Operators Appeals, 500 F.2d 722, 781
(D.C. Cir. 1974) (explaining that an employer should inform its employees of their rights under
the whistleblower provision of the Mine Safety Act, 30 U.S.C. § 820(b)(1)); see also Appellee's
Brief at 19, Neal (93-3013) (arguing that, based on Phillips, Honeywell had a duty to inform
Neal of her qui tam rights).
137. Neal, 33 F.3d at 864.
138. Id. at 865. Section 3730(h) expressly provides for reinstatement with the same seniority
status, twice the amount of back pay plus interest, compensation for any special damages sus-
tained because of the discrimination, court costs and reasonable attorneys' fees. 31 U.S.C.
§ 3730(h) (1988). For the full text of section 3730(h), see supra note 59.
139. Neal, 33 F.3d at 864.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 865.
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recovery to only those damages specifically enumerated in section
3730(h).
A. The Seventh Circuit Correctly Found That Neal Was
Entitled to Recover
In Neal, the Seventh Circuit held that Neal was entitled to re-
cover because it determined that the phrase "action filed or to be
filed" did not make qui tam litigation a condition subsequent to re-
ceiving protection under section 3730(h) of the FCA. 42 This finding
is correct because it comports with the purpose and legislative his-
tory of the FCA and section 3730(h), case law relying on the legis-
lative history, and the holdings of cases which construed similar
whistle blower provisions in other statutes.
First, the purpose and legislative history of the FCA and section
3730(h) support Neal's recovery. One of the purposes of the FCA is
to encourage private citizens to help the government eliminate or
reduce fraud by granting them the right to bring an action on behalf
of themselves and the government against unscrupulous Government
contractors. 14 3 Unfortunately, many private citizens refused to insti-
tute actions under the FCA because they feared retaliation in the
form of termination by their employer.14 4 Consequently, Congress
amended section 3730(h) to the FCA in 1986145 to encourage em-
ployees to assist the government in ferreting out fraudulent contrac-
tors by providing the employees protection against wrongful em-
ployer retaliation. 146
In Neal, the court held that Neal was entitled to a recovery be-
cause it found that a qui tam litigation was not a condition subse-
quent to being afforded protection under section 3730(h) of the
FCA. 41 Although the text of section 3730(h) does not expressly
provide for protection in the event that a qui tam suit is never insti-
142. Id. at 864.
143. See supra notes 65-72 and accompanying text (describing the impetus behind the enact-
ment of the FCA).
144. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text (noting the absence of qui tam claims prior
to the amendment of Section 3730(h)).
145. For a discussion of the 1986 amendments to the FCA, see supra notes 42-55.
146. Section 3730(h) encourages employees to assist the Government by granting the employ-
ees all relief necessary to make them whole. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) (1988). For the full text of
section 3730(h), see supra 59. For a discussion of the purposes of section 3730(h), see supra notes
65-72.
147. Neal v. Honeywell, Inc., 33 F.3d 860, 864 (7th Cir. 1994); see supra notes 127-42 (dis-
cussing the court's reasoning).
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tuted, this interpretation is in line with the purpose and legislative
history of section 3730(h) and the FCA because it provides protec-
tion to employees who disclose conduct which they believe to be
fraudulent even if the conduct turns out to be legitimate. Thus, the
holding encourages employees to disclose potentially fraudulent
claims by providing them protection even if a qui tam claim is never
instituted. Accordingly, in the spirit of the FCA, the holding helps
reduce and eliminate fraudulent claims against the government, 14
and the court's decision is consistent with the legislative history and
purpose of the FCA and section 3730(h).
Neal's recovery is also supported by case law. Although case law
interpreting section 3730(h) is sparse, the cases which do interpret
section 3730(h) in light of its legislative history support the finding
of the Seventh Circuit. 149 In Rehman v. ECC Int'l Corp.,5 ' the
court held that a qui tam lawsuit is not required for a plaintiff to
recover damages under section 3730(h) after it stated that section
3730(h) should be broadly construed to assure protection to employ-
ees who report potential misconduct by their employer.15' In United
States ex rel. Kent v. Aiello,'52 the court also concluded that a qui
tam lawsuit is not required for a plaintiff to receive protection under
section 3730(h). Case law interpreting similar whistle blower provi-
sions in other statutes also supports the Seventh Circuit's holding by
stating that internal corporate whistle blowers should be afforded
protection.' 53 Thus, the Seventh Circuit's finding that Neal is enti-
tled to recover from Honeywell even though no qui tam lawsuit was
ever initiated is supported by cases on the district court level inter-
preting section 3730(h) and by the great weight of authority of
cases construing similar federal whistle blower protection statutes.
148. By encouraging employees to disclose potentially fraudulent claims, the Government sets
off a chain reaction which leads to fewer fraudulent claims against the Government. First, em-
ployees come forward with a greater number of potentially fraudulent claims. This means that
more fraudulent claims are discovered, and therefore, there are fewer fraudulent claims against
the Government.
149. Although some cases do suggest that qui tam litigation is required to invoke the protection
of section 3730(h), these cases fail to adequately consider the legislative history and purpose be-
hind Section 3730(h). See Neal v. Honeywell, Inc., 826 F. Supp. 266 (N.D. III. 1993), affd, 33
F.3d 860 (7th Cir. 1994).
150. Rehman v. ECC Int'l Corp., No. 90-425-Civ-Orl-22, 1993 WL 85758 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
151. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text (discussing the facts and the holding in
Rehman).
152. 836 F. Supp. 720 (E.D. Cal. 1993).
153. See supra note 120 (listing cases which hold that internal corporate whistle blowers should
be afforded whistle blower protection).
1995] 1381
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
B. The Seventh Circuit Erroneously Limited Neal's Recovery
In Neal, the Seventh Circuit found that the term, "special dam-
ages," did not extend beyond the damages expressed in section
3730(h) and held that Neal's recovery was limited to those ex-
pressed damages.15 The court further held that an employer had no
duty to inform its employees of their rights under the FCA, and
therefore, declined to allow Neal to recover the damages she could
have had in a qui tam suit.' 55 This holding fails to consider the
legislative history of section 3730(h).
The purpose behind the relief provision of section 3730(h) is to
punish and deter fraudulent and discriminatory conduct on the part
of contractors through retribution of double back pay, special dam-
ages and punitive damages, if warranted. 56 Allowing Neal her re-
quested recovery would effectively punish Honeywell and provide
strong deterrence for other contractors. However, the court in Neal
did not want to extend the damages recoverable under section
3730(h) beyond its express language because it did not want to ex-
pose defendants to double recovery or chill settlements.5 7 However,
these reasons are not valid when considered in light of the legislative
history of section 3730(h).
By allowing Neal to recover the damages she could have recov-
ered in a qui tam suit, the court would not be exposing Honeywell
to a double recovery. Instead, in line with the purpose of the relief
granted by section 3730(h), the court would be punishing Honey-
well for discriminating against Neal when she phoned the internal
hotline to inquire about her options for reporting Honeywell's mis-
conduct.' 58 Additionally, even if awarding Neal her requested recov-
ery would chill future settlements between the government and con-
154. Neal v. Honeywell, Inc., 33 F.3d 860, 864-65 (7th Cir. 1994).
155. Id.
156. For a discussion of the purpose behind the relief provision of section 3730(h), see supra
notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 140-41 and accompanying text (discussing the deleterious effects of al-
lowing Ms. Neal to recover the damages she could have had in a qui tam suit).
158. When Neal first decided to come forward with her information, she called a Honeywell
"hotline" in an attempt to determine her rights in remaining anonymous. Appellee's Brief at 2,
Neal (93-3013). However, Honeywell's legal counsel told Neal that her only option was to tell him
about the misconduct and that he would take care of it. Id. at 2-3. Honeywell did not inform Neal
of her right to remain anonymous through a qui tam lawsuit. Id. This phone call eventually led to
Honeywell's harassment of Neal. Id. See supra notes 89-91, 97-103 and accompanying text (dis-




tractors, it would accomplish something much greater - it would
deter future fraudulent claims. If a contractor knew that it could
face the possibility of an award above and beyond its settlement
with the government, it would reconsider its conduct. Although the
court's decision does provide an employee with the express damages
of section 3730(h), the purposes of deterrence and punishment
would be better served by a decision that allowed an employee in
Neal's situation to recover what she would have been entitled to
under a qui tam suit.
The court also erroneously concluded that an employer has no
duty to inform employees of their rights under the FCA. 59 This
holding is not in line with authority interpreting a similar whistle
blower provision and finding such a duty,160 and may, in fact, en-
courage contractor fraud.' Therefore, to discourage contractor
fraud, the court should have held that an employer does have a duty
to inform its employees of their rights under the FCA. Accordingly,
the court could then have awarded Neal the recovery she could have
had from a qui tam suit as punishment to Honeywell. Such a hold-
ing would then be in line with the intent that section 3730(h) serve
as punishment for fraudulent creditors and the holding would not
frustrate the purpose of the FCA.
IV. IMPACT
Given the extensiveness of fraud in the area of government de-
fense contracts, it is likely that hundreds, or maybe even thousands,
of employees nationwide are aware of fraudulent practices on the
part of their employers.162 It is equally likely that those same em-
ployees are afraid to disclose their employers' practices because
they, like Judith Neal, are not aware of their rights under the False
159. Neal, 33 F.3d at 865.
160. See supra note 136 (discussing authority finding such a duty).
161. For example, if an unscrupulous contractor has no duty to inform its employees of their
rights under the FCA, the contractor will probably choose not to inform its employees of their
rights. Then, if any employees find out about misconduct, they will not disclose such information
for fear of losing their job, and the fraud will go undetected. Thus, the purpose of the FCA would
be frustrated.
162. In 1983, the U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board conducted a survey to determine the
extent of unreported fraud. BLOWING THE WHISTLE IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: A COMPARA-
TIVE ANALYSIS OF 1980 AND 1983 SURVEY FINDINGS. A Report of the United States Merit Sys-
tems Board (1984). Of the approximately five thousand federal employees respoinding to the sur-
vey, 25% reported that they believed they had direct knowledge of fraudulant conduct by their
employers but did not report it. Id. at 21.
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Claims Act. 163 Unfortunately, according to the Seventh Circuit's de-
cision in Neal v. Honeywell, Inc.,164 those employees may never
learn their rights because their employers do not have a duty to so
inform them. On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit's decision in
Neal does help alleviate employee fears by providing protection
from employer retaliation regardless of whether a qui tam suit is
ever filed.
The biggest impact from this decision is that plaintiffs like Neal
will now be able to bring forward potentially fraudulent misconduct
on behalf of their employers without the threat of being retaliated
against if a qui tam suit is never filed. In this regard the decision is
beneficial. It states that courts will no longer allow employers to
retaliate against employees who legitimately attempt to aid a gov-
ernmental investigation of fraud even if a suit under the FCA never
comes to fruition. Thus, the Seventh Circuit extends protection
under section 3730(h) to the largest possible class of employees
while refusing to extend protection to the small, but present, class of
employees who fraudulently institute qui tam actions in search of
monetary gain. In this manner, the Seventh Circuit's decision up-
holds both the goals and purposes behind the FCA and section
3730(h) by encouraging employees to come forward with instances
of potential misconduct and eliminating the concomitant fear of be-
ing left unemployed.
However, the court's decision also has a detrimental impact. If
plaintiffs like Neal are unaware of their rights, their lack of knowl-
edge will not soon be cured because, under Neal, their employers
have no duty to inform them of their rights. 65 This portion of the
decision is problematic because it is not consistent with the legisla-
tive history of section 3730(h) and frustrates its purpose. It does not
allow sufficient punishment of unscrupulous contractors and it en-
courages fraudulent conduct. Instead of punishing unscrupulous
contractors, it allows employers, like Honeywell, to learn of the
fraudulent practices from their employee and then approach the
government with a settlement proposal that significantly reduces the
company's liability to just a fraction of what its fraudulent conduct
163. According to the survey by the U.S. Merit Systems Board, fear of employer reprisal was
the second most cited reason for not reporting employer fraud. Id. at 24.
164. Neal v. Honeywell, Inc., 33 F.3d 860 (7th Cir. 1994).
165. The Seventh Circuit stated that the FCA does not require an employer to inform an em-
ployee of his or her right to file suit under the FCA's qui tam provisions. Neal, 33 F.3d at 865.
1384 [Vol. 44:1363
WHISTLE BLOWER PROTECTION
cost the government. 6 Allowing Neal to recover in such a situation
would not subject employers to double recovery as the court sug-
gests, but merely punish Honeywell and give Neal what should be
rightfully hers. Additionally, this decision is problematic because it
is inconsistent with interpretations of a similar whistle blower provi-
sion which placed this duty upon employers.
A remedy for this problem could take the shape of an amendment
to the FCA in either one of two forms. First, if the relief provision
of section 3730(h) was amended so that it read, "any special dam-
ages sustained as a result of the discrimination, including punitive
damages, litigation costs and reasonable attorneys' fees," then Neal
could recover the award she requested as punitive damages resulting
from Honeywell's fraudulent and discriminatory conduct. This
amendment would help further the goal of both the FCA and sec-
tion 3730(h) by eliminating and discouraging fraudulent conduct on
the part of government contractors through punishment and
deterrence.
An alternative amendment could take the form of a new subsec-
tion to the FCA requiring employers to inform employees about
their rights under the FCA. 1 7 This amendment would also en-
courage employees to bring forth contractor misconduct because
employees would be fully informed of their rights and be able to
proceed with confidence that any retaliatory conduct on the part of
their employer would be punished. Therefore, either proposed
amendment would help encourage the assistance of private citizens
in disclosing fraud against the government and discourage fraudu-
lent misconduct on the part of contractors.
V. CONCLUSION
Under the decision of Neal v. Honeywell, Inc.,168 plaintiffs like
Judith Neal are provided protection from employer retaliation in re-
sponse to the employee's disclosure of potentially fraudulent miscon-
duct whether or not a qui tam lawsuit is ever instituted. However, if
the plaintiffs do not know their rights under the False Claims
166. In Honeywell's case, they were able to reduce their liability by over eighty percent. See
supra note 88 and accompanying text & supra note 95 (discussing the actual cost of Honeywell's
fraudulent conduct and the amount of Honeywell's settlement with the government).
167. Informing employees could be done simply by placing a notice on company bulletin
boards.
168. 33 F.3d 860 (7th Cir. 1994).
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Act,1 9 their employers will probably never inform them because
employers have no duty to inform their employees of their rights.
Consequently, if the government learns of the employer's fraudulent
conduct but settles with the employer before filing an action under
the FCA, the plaintiff is not entitled to any of the recovery he or she
could have had if a qui tam action had been brought. In addition,
the employer can thus avoid paying all but a small fraction of his
total liability to the government. Such a result does not punish the
employer at all and may encourage fraudulent conduct.
The result in Neal is consistent with the intended purposes of the
FCA in that providing protection to employees whether or not a qui
tam suit is instituted encourages employees to come forward with
their information. However, the result is also inconsistent with the
intended purposes of the FCA in that it does not punish the fraudu-
lent contractor sufficiently to deter future conduct. Therefore, al-
though the Seventh Circuit decision correctly provides protection for
an employee where a suit by the government against the employer
never results, courts need to go further to punish employers and
grant employees the recovery to which they are entitled.
Timothy P. Olson
169. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-30 (1988).
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